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1 – Outline
In his famous (1960) article, physicist Eugene Wigner ad-
dressed a philosophical problem concerning the applicability 
of mathematics to science. Briefly speaking, the problem can 
be paraphrased as follows: mathematical concepts are (often) 
not intentionally developed for physical application and are 
part of a discipline which is epistemologically and ontologi-
cally different from physics;1 so, how is it possible that these 
concepts are so amazingly effective in physics? We can call 
this problem the “Wigner’s puzzle” or “problem of the math-
ematical applicability”.
Despite its philosophical relevance, philosophers have ig-
nored this problem for very long. Not only did they ignore 
Wigner’s puzzle, but they also ignored the applicability of 
mathematics itself as a philosophically interesting topic. Only 
in 1998 was the topic brought back to the attention of the 
philosophical community, namely by Mark Steiner. Steiner 
showed that the problem of the applicability of mathematics 
is not a single problem, but that four related problems should 
be distinguished: a semantic problem, a metaphysical prob-
lem, a descriptive problem, and a heuristic problem. Accord-
ing to Steiner, some of them can be easily solved but others 
are quite puzzling and still without solution. An important 
lesson from Steiner’s work is that we should refrain from con-
flating the different problems and address them separately.2
More recently, Christopher Pincock (2012) underlined how 
mathematics plays a lot of different roles in scientific rep-
resentations.3 Some of these roles are philosophically more 
problematic than others, but the important point is that, if we 
In the present paper I will focus on the relation between the main versions of the in-
dispensability argument and the applicability of mathematics. I will show not only that 
the mathematical applicability problems are as urgent for realist philosophers as they 
are for anti-realist philosophers; but also that the supporters of the indispensability 
arguments cannot avoid to acknowledge the different roles that mathematics plays in 
science: I will show in this paper that ignoring these different roles might get realists 
into trouble.
1 – Outline
2 –  Metaphysical and seman-
tic realism
3 – Arguments for metaphysi-
cal realism
4 – Arguments for semantic 
realism
5 – Conclusion
1 - Just to offer few examples, mathematics studies abstract structures, whereas physics is about the real world; mathematics is mainly non-empirical, 
whereas physics is highly empirical.
2 - The first problem concerns the fact that mathematical terms (typically, numerical terms) seem to play different semantical roles in mathematical and 
mixed statements (mixed statements are statements in which both mathematical and physical terms appear). This problem, according to Steiner, has been 
solved by Frege, who offered a uniform account for both mathematical and mixed statements. The second problem stems from the metaphysical gap be-
tween the abstract entities described by mathematics and the concrete objects described by physics. Once again, according to Steiner, this problem has been 
solved by Frege, by means of his definition of mathematical objects as extensions of concepts directly related to the application of the mathematical theory 
at issue. The third problem concerns the descriptive applicability of single mathematical concepts. Each mathematical concept raises a specific descriptive 
problem; for some mathematical concepts we can account for their descriptive applicability (for example: the theory of fiber bundle), but for others (for 
example: Hilbert spaces, or complex analysis) we are seemingly left without a solution. The final problem concerns the effectiveness of using mathematical 
analogies (i.e., non-physical analogies) in predicting new laws, objects or phenomena in physics. Steiner does not offer a solution for this problem, but ac-
cording to him it raises a serious problem for naturalism in contemporary physics. For more about Steiner’s analysis and contemporary debates about the 
applicability of mathematics see (Pincock 2012).
3 - First of all, Pincock distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic mathematics employed in representations: the first is the mathematics that appears in 
the content of a representation; the latter is the additional mathematics that, even though it does not appear in the representation, still contributes to the 
efficacy of the representation. Beyond this, Pincock specifies four dimensions along which mathematics can contribute to a scientific representation. These 
dimensions run along four basic dichotomies: (1) causal/acausal content, (2) concrete fixed/abstract varying content, (3) small-large representation (issues 
of scale), and (4) constitutive/derivative content. Thus, for a given mathematical representation, we can ask whether the mathematics involved is intrinsic 
or extrinsic, and then we can ask whether and how the mathematics contributes to (1), (2), (3) or (4) (it is also possible that the contribution combines differ-
ent features of two or more of these dimensions).
Key words: anti-realism, applicability of mathematics, indispensability arguments, indispen-
sability of mathematics, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of mathematics, realism.
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want to better understand the applicability of mathematics in 
science, we should focus very carefully on these roles, recog-
nize them and analyze them as thoroughly as possible.
Following Steiner and Pincock, the idea that the role played 
by mathematics in science is much more complex than the 
label “applicability of mathematics” might lead one to think 
will be an important assumption in this paper. I will show 
that underestimating this point may entail unwanted conse-
quences.
Due to its original formulation, Wigner’s puzzle has often 
been interpreted as a puzzle for anti-realist philosophies only, 
which can be seen as one of the reasons for the philosophical 
neglect of the applicability of mathematics. As suggested by 
Colyvan (2001b), realist philosophies are often considered to 
be immune to Wigner’s puzzle and some philosophers con-
ceived realism as the only metaphysical framework in which 
the applicability of mathematics is not completely unintelli-
gible (see for example Davies 1992, pp. 140-60; and Penrose 
1990, pp. 556-7). Among the most important and compel-
ling arguments for mathematical realism, however, are the 
so called “indispensability arguments”. These arguments are 
explicitly grounded on the assumption that mathematics is 
not only applicable, but even indispensable to science. Yet, 
supporters of the indispensability arguments generally as-
sume the applicability of mathematics as a brute fact with-
out any further clarification: they usually do not acknowledge 
the different roles that mathematics plays in science, and in 
their discussions they do not pay attention to the philosoph-
ical problems connected to these roles. However, as Colyvan 
(2001b) showed, the supporters of the indispensability argu-
ments are not exempt from Wigner’s puzzle: it is a problem 
for them as well as for anti-realist philosophers.
In the present paper I will focus on the relation between the 
main versions of the indispensability argument (Quine’s and 
Colyvan’s, Putnam’s, and the explanatory indispensability 
argument) and the applicability of mathematics. I will show 
not only that, as Colyvan says, the mathematical applicability 
problems are as urgent for realist philosophers as they are 
for anti-realist philosophers (in this sense, I will extend Coly-
van’s results by showing that also the supporters of Putnam’s 
indispensability argument and of the so-called explanatory 
indispensability argument are not exempt from the philo-
sophical problems raised by the applicability of mathemat-
ics); but also that the supporters of the indispensability ar-
guments cannot avoid acknowledging the different roles that 
mathematics plays in science: I will show in this paper that 
ignoring these different roles might get realists into trouble.
In section 2, I will introduce the original main versions of the 
indispensability argument: Quine’s argument for metaphysi-
cal realism and Putnam’s argument for semantic realism. The 
indispensability arguments for metaphysical realism will be 
discussed in section 3. I will first discuss Quine’s and Coly-
van’s arguments in detail (section 3.1), and I will make some 
remarks on the notion of “indispensability” there employed 
(section 3.2). Then, I will consider the employment of indis-
pensability arguments in science and I will discuss the analo-
gies and disanalogies between these arguments and the indis-
pensability arguments for metaphysical realism (section 3.3). 
Finally, I will present and discuss the so-called “explanatory 
indispensability argument” (section 3.4). The indispensabili-
ty arguments for semantic realism will be discussed in section 
4, where I will take into consideration Putnam’s argument 
(section 4.1) and the semantic version of the explanatory in-
dispensability argument (section 4.2).
2 – Metaphysical and semantic 
realism
The first formulation of an indispensability argument is joint-
ly credited to Quine (1961) and Putnam (1979a), and for this 
reason the argument is also usually called the “Quine-Put-
nam argument”. However, many commentators have pointed 
out that Quine and Putnam formulate the argument in two 
distinct ways and that they aim to prove different claims (for 
a discussion about the differences between Quine’s argument 
and Putnam’s argument, see Liggins 2008). Quine’s argu-
ment can be summarized in the following way:
(1
Q
) we ought to have ontological commitment to all those en-
tities that are indispensable
Q
 to our best scientific theories;
(2
Q
) mathematical entities are indispensable
Q
 to our best sci-
entific theories;
(3
Q
) hence, we ought to have ontological commitment to 
(some) mathematical entities.
Putnam’s argument, instead, can be summarized as follows:
(1P) we ought to believe in the truth of any claim that plays an 
indispensableP role in our best scientific theories;
(2P) mathematical claims play and indispensableP role in our 
best scientific theories;
(3P) hence, we ought to believe in the truth of (some) mathe-
matical claims.
The main difference between the two arguments is that Quine 
argues in favour of a metaphysical realism, while Putnam 
rather argues in favour of a semantic realism. As we will see, 
another important difference is that they bestow different 
meanings to the word “indispensable”—what is graphically 
expressed by the subscripts appended to the word “indispen-
sable” in the different arguments.
Colyvan (2001a) probably offers the most pervasive and 
complete analysis of this kind of argument and proposes his 
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version of the argument. Colyvan thinks, in agreement with 
Quine, that the indispensability argument is actually an argu-
ment for Platonism, and hence the metaphysical realism. Co-
lyvan’s argument is therefore very close to Quine’s argument. 
However, as Pincock (2012, chapt. 9) points out, Colyvan’s 
notion of indispensability is different both from Quine’s and 
from Putnam’s. So, Colyvan’s argument must be kept distinct 
from the other two.
In the following sections I will consider each of these argu-
ments, in order to explore the connections between them and 
the roles played by mathematics in science.
3 – Arguments for metaphysi-
cal realism
3.1 Quine’s and Colyvan’s argument
That Quine’s argument does not absolve the mathematical 
realist from the applicability problems has been already not-
ed by many. Colyvan (2001b) himself points out that Quine’s 
argument, whether it is right or not, does not say anything 
about why mathematics is indispensable. Rather, it assumes 
indispensability as a brute fact—and to answer why mathe-
matics is indispensable we necessarily have to get deeper 
into the applicability of mathematics and into the many roles 
played by mathematics in science.4 In this section I will go 
further than this argument of Colyvan and I will argue not 
only that the Quinean realist has still to clarify why math-
ematics is indispensable, but also that the argument itself 
forces her to get deeper into the effectiveness of mathematics 
within science.
There are two ways to defend Quine’s indispensability argu-
ment. The first consists in taking the bull by the horns and 
trying to found the argument in itself, autonomously. The 
second consists in considering the indispensability argu-
ment as a particular case of a wider class of arguments, which 
share the same logical form. In this second way we try, in 
some sense, to ‘transfer’ epistemic confirmation from one ar-
gument to another, by means of analogy. These two defense 
strategies do not exclude each other; on the contrary, they 
support each other. The first strategy assumes that the log-
ical form of the argument is valid and tries to show that the 
premises are true; the second strategy tries to show that we 
have good reasons to apply this argument to mathematical 
entities because this case is analogous to the application of 
(apparently) the same argument to other scientific entities—
an application which we normally consider non-problematic.
3.2 Remarks on the notion of indispensability
Let us start with the first strategy. It usually implies that one 
focus on the two premises and how to support them. Prem-
ise (1
Q
) is usually considered to be founded on two important 
Quinean theses: Confirmational Holism and Naturalism. The 
idea is that Naturalism tells us that we must commit our-
selves to the existence of the entities required by our best sci-
entific theories, and Confirmational Holism prevents us from 
interpreting part of these theories non-realistically. Both doc-
trines have been variously called into question, and there is 
currently a wide debate about the effectiveness of these two 
thesis in supporting (1
Q
) (see for example Panza & Sereni 
2015). However, it is not my intention to focus on these de-
bates. I will rather focus on the meaning of “indispensable
Q
”, 
because Quine’s argument is evidently centered around this 
notion, but it is not clear what exactly he meant by it.
First, it should be noted that “indispensability” should not 
be interpreted as generic “non-eliminability”. If “indispensa-
ble” simply means “non-eliminable”, it follows from Craig’s 
theorem that any mathematical entity is actually eliminable, 
which makes the second premise of the indispensability ar-
gument untenable. Hence, indispensability must be intend-
ed in a different sense (see Colyvan 2001a, p. 77; for a more 
detailed analysis of Craig’s theorem, see Putnam 1965 and 
Field 1980, p. 8). According to Quine, an entity x appearing 
in a theory T can be said to be indispensable only when its 
elimination from T produces a new theory T’ that can even 
be equivalent to T but is notwithstanding less preferable than 
T. Thus, the notion of indispensable
Q 
involves the notion of 
“preference for one  theory over another”. In order to under-
stand how Quine sees this notion of theory preference (and, 
consequently, the notion of indispensability
Q
), we must take 
into consideration what he called the process of “regimenta-
tion”.
When we want to systematically present our beliefs, we aim 
to do it in a way that is as coherent and simple as possible. 
According to Quine, this goal is reached when we formulate 
our beliefs in the language of first-order logic. This process of 
regimentation is particularly important because Quine holds 
that we can clarify our ontological commitment only after 
carrying out this process of regimentation. If Quine is right 
in claiming that the proper language in which we should reg-
iment our scientific beliefs is the language of first-order logic, 
then it is quite easy to see which entities we are ontologically 
committed to: we have simply to check which sentences of 
the form ∃xFx are implied by our beliefs. It is at this level that 
we can prefer one theory over another. To sum up, we should 
understand “indispensable
Q
” in the following way: an entity 
(or a class of entities) x is in Quine’s view indispensable if, 
once the regimentation has been done, it is not possible to 
eliminate sentences which quantify over this entity (or over 
this class of entities). Quine seems to hold that mathemati-
cal entities are ‘indispensable’ precisely in this sense: “cer-
tain things we want to say in science may compel us to admit 
into the range of values of the variables of quantification not 
only physical objects but also classes and relations of them; 
also numbers, functions, and other objects of pure mathe-
4- An analogous objection has been made by Kitcher (1984, pp. 104-105).
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matics” (Quine 1957, p. 16). But regimentation, as Quine puts 
the matter in different places, is not very different from the 
general process of belief choice and belief adjustment, and 
hence is not very different from the general process of doing 
science:
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to 
our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we 
adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest concep-
tual scheme into which the disoriented fragments of raw expe-
rience can be fitted and arranged. [. . .]. To whatever extent the 
adoption of any system of scientific theory may be said to be a 
matter of language, the same—but no more—may be said of the 
adoption of an ontology. (Quine 1961, p. 16)
And again:
We can draw explicit ontological lines when desired. We can 
regiment our notation [. . .]. Various turns of phrase in ordinary 
language that seem to invoke novel sorts of objects may disap-
pear under such regimentation. At other points new ontic com-
mitments may emerge. There is room for choice, and one choos-
es with a view to simplicity in one’s overall system of the world. 
(Quine 1981, p. 9-10)
Regimentation seems thus to be guided by a general criterion 
of simplicity and transparency. However, in some cases it is 
just the mathematical apparatus that makes one theory pref-
erable to another, often just in virtue of a greater simplicity 
granted to the theory by the mathematics itself. Mathematical 
concepts often make a theory easier and therefore more effec-
tive in making predictions and new discoveries. In this sense, 
one might say that a given mathematized theory is simpler 
than its non-mathematized counterpart. If this is so, the sit-
uation turns out to be quite odd: mathematics is indispensa-
ble because a scientific theory mathematically formulated is 
to be preferred over a scientific theory non-mathematically 
formulated; it is to be preferred because it is simpler; and it 
is simpler because it is mathematically formulated. This is 
not necessarily a problem, provided that we are able to ex-
plain why, how, and in which sense mathematics contributes 
to this preference. But this means that the Quinean realist 
should say something more about this ‘simplifying’ role of 
mathematics in physics if she wants to hold onto the validity 
of her argument. Otherwise, one might object that the notion 
of indispensability is, in some sense, viciously circular, since 
it should grant an independent and autonomous foundation 
for the claim that mathematics is indispensable, but math-
ematics turns out to play a role in shaping the notion of in-
dispensability itself. More specifically, the question that the 
Quinean realist should answer is: In which sense does mathe-
matics play a role in shaping ‘simpler’ physical theories? And 
how is it possible that mathematics can do that, provided that 
mathematical concepts have not been devised to accomplish 
such a role?
An analogous remark can be made against Colyvan’s indis-
pensability argument. Colyvan’s argument in intended to 
support metaphysical realism as well as Quine’s argument. 
However, his notion of “indispensability” is a bit different 
from Quine’s. Colyvan (1999) defines “indispensability
c
” in 
the following way: an entity is dispensable to a theory T if 
there exists a second theory T’ with the following properties: 
(i) T’ has exactly the same observational consequences as T, 
but in T’ the entity in question is neither mentioned nor pre-
dicted; and (ii) T’ is preferable to T. If an entity is not dis-
pensable in this sense, then it is indispensable. The main 
difference between “indispensable
Q
” and “indispensable
C
” is 
that Colyvan’s notion is not centered on the Quinean process 
of regimentation. Instead of arguing, like Quine does, that 
ontological commitment is implied by the simplest and most 
transparent regimented theory, Colyvan gives criteria that al-
low us to determine whether or not a theory T’ is preferable 
over another theory T. As he says,
whether an entity is indispensable or not is really a question 
of theory choice and so is guided by the usual canons of theory 
choice. These may include: simplicity, unificatory power, bold-
ness, formal elegance and so on. It seems, then, that an entity can 
be indispensable even though empirically equivalent theories 
exist that do not quantify over the entity in question. (Colyvan 
2001b, p. 270)
This point made by Colyvan rules out any attempt, stand-
ardly nominalistic or à la Field, to offer a non-mathematical 
reconstruction of contemporary physics: even if such a re-
construction is theoretically possible, it is unlikely that the 
result will be preferable to our standard formulation accord-
ing to the criteria that Colyvan proposes, and hence the in-
dispensability of mathematics is saved. However, in this way 
Colyvan exposes himself to the same remark we pointed out 
for Quine: in some cases it is just the mathematical appara-
tus that makes a theory preferable to another. In this sense, 
mathematics can be one of the criteria according to which we 
judge whether a theory is preferable over another or not. So 
Colyvan, as well as Quine, should offer an account of math-
ematics ‘simplifying’ role in order to avoid circularity in his 
definition of indispensability.
3.3 Transferring epistemic confirmation
The second way to defend the indispensability argument for 
metaphysical realism in mathematics is by considering it as a 
particular case belonging to a wider class of arguments of the 
same form. Those who hold that a realistic stance on math-
ematical entities would absolve the realist from dealing with 
the applicability problems usually appeal to this strategy in 
order to support their claim. In this section we will assess this 
strategy.
According to Colyvan (2001a), the general form of these ar-
guments can be presented in the following way (G):
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If apparent reference to some entity (or class of entities) x is in-
dispensable to our best scientific theories, then we ought to be-
lieve in the existence of x. (p. 7)
As an example of an application of this kind of argument in a 
different context from mathematical ontology, Colyvan men-
tions the scientists’ belief in the existence of dark matter:
Most astronomers are convinced of the existence of so called 
“dark matter” to explain (among other things) certain facts about 
the rotation curves of spiral galaxies. [. . .] this is an indispen-
sability argument. Anyone unconvinced of the existence of dark 
matter is not unconvinced of the cogency of the general form of 
the argument being used; it’s just that they are inclined to think 
that there are better explanations of the facts in question. (p. 8)
As Colyvan points out, the existence of dark matter is explan-
atorily indispensable to our best scientific theories, and we 
accept it as a consequence of an inference to the best expla-
nation. In this argument however, there seems to be talk of 
another kind of indispensability than in the arguments we 
considered before. Considering Quine’s version of the in-
dispensability argument, we see that mathematical entities 
play no explanatory role. Rather, mathematical entities are 
referentially indispensable; namely, there seems to be no 
way to formulate our best scientific theories without quan-
tifying over mathematical entities (according to the meaning 
of “indispensable
Q
” we have just seen). But this is the general 
meaning of “indispensable” as it is assumed by the formula-
tion of the argument.
Thus, even if Quine’s argument and the argument about dark 
matter both seem to be an application of (G), the two appli-
cations should not be considered to be entirely the same: in 
the latter case we have a (more or less) clear application of 
the notion of indispensability (viz. indispensability in terms 
of explanation); in the first case we don’t. The furrow we have 
just cut between the two cases prevents us from transferring 
epistemic value from one case to another. What makes the 
latter argument plausible cannot be simply transferred on the 
former case, since part of this plausibility hinges on the fact 
that the adjective “indispensable” is employed, in the dark 
matter case, in a specified sense.
However, in response to this objection one might claim that 
there is anyway an analogy between the argument concerning 
dark matter and Quine’s argument, and that this analogy is 
based on the so-called “no miracle argument”. The “no mir-
acle argument” is usually employed by scientific realists in 
order to justify their position: we must accept the existence 
of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories, be-
cause otherwise we must admit that the fact that the nature 
works as it works is just a miracle. For example, if we don’t 
believe in electrons (that is, if we accept the electron theory 
without believing in the existence of electrons), then how can 
we explain the behaviour of a galvanometer? There seems to 
be no way other than to accept that it is a miracle. The analo-
gy between Quine’s argument and the argument in favour of 
the existence of electrons is underlined and criticized also by 
Colyvan (2001b):
It’s no miracle, claim scientific realists, that electron theory is re-
markably effective in describing all sorts of physical phenomena 
such as lightning, electromagnetism, the generation of X-rays in 
Roentgen tubes and so on. Why is it no miracle? Because elec-
trons exist and are at least partially causally responsible for the 
phenomena in question. Furthermore, it’s no surprise that elec-
tron theory is able to play an active role in novel discoveries such 
as superconductors. Again this is explained by the existence of 
electrons and their causal powers. (pp. 270-71)
Thus, if we reject the realist claim that electrons do exist, 
we should admit that the extraordinary effectiveness of this 
theory in making predictions and describing a large class of 
phenomena is just a miracle. For this reason, there is indeed 
a pressure on anti-realists in science, since they seem unable 
to explain the efficacy of electron theory in describing real-
ity (for an example of such an argument for scientific real-
ism, see Smart 1963). But can we raise the same problem for 
mathematical entities? According to Colyvan (2001b), the 
argument can hardly be exported to the field of mathematical 
realism, since
[t]here is an important disanalogy [. . .] between the case of elec-
trons and the case of sets. Electrons have causal powers—they 
can bring about changes in the world. Mathematical entities such 
as sets are usually taken to be causally idle—they are platonic in 
the sense that they do not exist in space-time nor do they have 
causal powers. So how is that the positing of such platonic enti-
ties reduces mystery? (Colyvan 2001b, p. 271)
The fact that the existence of electrons is able to remove the 
aura of mystery around the theory of electrons does not come 
from the bare existence of the electron, but from the fact that 
they exist in a certain way, namely they are causally effective. 
The same seems not to hold for mathematical entities, since 
a Platonist usually conceives of them as abstract entities with 
no causal power.
These considerations suggest that it is not possible to transfer 
epistemic confirmation from the indispensability arguments 
as they are employed in empirical sciences to Quine’s argu-
ment, for the very reason that the notion of indispensabili-
ty refers, in the first case, to a well-specified role played by 
the entities at issue; in the latter, to no specific role. Still, 
one might insist that the two arguments are substantially the 
same (and that hence we can transfer epistemic confirma-
tion from one argument to the other) by arguing that math-
ematical entities do really have a specified and non-generic 
indispensable role in science, either explanatory or causal. 
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This argument has been developed in the literature in two 
different ways. Bigelow (1988) and Maddy (1990), for exam-
ple, have argued for a causal effectiveness of mathematical 
entities. However, in her subsequent works Maddy seems to 
have abandoned such a view (see Maddy 1997, 2007). This 
option is quite marginal in the contemporary debate, and 
actually the fact that the Quinean realist is compelled to say 
that mathematical entities are causally active is rather seen as 
a difficulty for Platonism (see for example Cheyne & Pigden 
1996). On the other side, a great part of recent debates around 
the indispensability argument tries to show that mathemat-
ical entities actually play an indispensable explanatory role 
in empirical sciences (see for example Lyon & Colyvan 2008; 
Colyvan 2002, 2010; Baker 2005, 2009). In both cases, the 
supporters of the indispensability argument try to boost the 
indispensability argument by showing that the indispensable 
role mathematical entities play in science can be specified in 
one sense or in another.
3.4 Explanatory indispensability argument
Of the above two strategies, the first seems to be the most dif-
ficult. Unfortunately, at least for now, there is no convincing 
argument that can satisfactorily clarify in which sense math-
ematical entities are causally active. One might say that we 
can employ the mathematical entity (or class of entities) x in 
describing the physical phenomenon P because x is part of 
the causal chain that determines the nature of P. However, 
this seems hardly promising for our purposes; this claim can-
not be considered as a satisfying account of the applicability 
of mathematics until we offer a satisfying account of what it 
means for a mathematical entity to be part of the causal chain 
of a certain phenomenon.
The second strategy seems more promising, and has been 
widely discussed in recent times. We can formulate an ex-
planatory version of the indispensability argument as follows:
(1
EXP
) we ought to have ontological commitment to any entity 
that plays an indispensable explanatory role in our best sci-
entific theories;
(2
EXP
) mathematical entities play an indispensable explanato-
ry role in our best scientific theories;
(3
EXP
) hence, we ought to have ontological commitment to 
mathematical entities.
This argument needs some clarification. First of all, one 
should specify what is meant by “explanatorily indispensa-
ble” and “mathematical explanation” in science. Further, 
we need to establish that there are entities that play an in-
dispensable explanatory role, hence we need an example of 
indispensable mathematical explanation in science. Usually 
(see for example Pincock 2012), a scientific explanation is 
said to be “mathematical” if it makes use of a mathematical 
claim. But in order to understand that the explanation is real-
ly mathematical (i.e. the mathematics in it is non-eliminable) 
we should put it on probation by means of a replacement test: 
if we eliminate the mathematical claim from the explanation 
and the explanatory value disappears, then the explanation 
can be said to be “mathematical”. However, this ‘replacement 
test’ clarifies what we mean by mathematical explanation in 
science, but it does not exhaust the meaning of “explanatorily 
indispensable”, since we can have different, competing expla-
nations that do not make use of mathematical claims. Hence, 
we must submit the explanation to another test, let us call it 
the “comparison test”: consider all the possible explanations 
of a certain phenomenon; if the mathematical one is the best 
one (i.e. if it has the greatest explanatory power), then the 
mathematics employed is explanatorily indispensable.
Are there indispensable mathematical explanations in sci-
ence? The answer to this question is widely debated among 
philosophers. On one side in this debate, there are philoso-
phers like Colyvan, Baker, Batterman, and Pincock who argue 
that there really are examples of such explanations (see for 
example Baker 2005; Batterman 2002, 2010; Pincock 2011a, 
2011b, 2012). Three examples have become paradigmatic: 
the explanation of the periodic life cycle of some species of 
cicada, the explanation of the hexagonal form of the bee’s 
honeycomb and the explanation of why it is not possible to 
cross all the bridges of Königsberg exactly once in a circuit 
that returns to the starting point. On the other side, philoso-
phers like Melia, Daly and Langford have tried to show that 
these explanations are not real examples of mathematical ex-
planations (see for example Melia 2000, 2002; Daly & Lang-
ford 2009). Without going in too much detail concerning this 
debate, let me make some remarks about how this relates to 
the applicability of mathematics.
First of all, it must be noted that, even if we admit that there 
are indispensable mathematical explanations in science, this 
is of no help for the analysis of the applicability of mathemat-
ics. For two reasons: first, the explanatory role of mathemat-
ics is not the only role for mathematics in science, and hence 
we have still to clarify the effectiveness of mathematics in 
all these other roles;5 second, the indispensability argument 
does not offer an account of why mathematics is helpful in 
explaining physical phenomena. The eliminability test and 
the comparison test permit us to say whether a mathematical 
claim plays an indispensable role in explaining a certain phe-
nomenon or not, but they are not aimed at accounting for the 
conditions that a mathematical claim has to satisfy in order 
to have an explanatory power. In this sense, the explanatory 
indispensability argument seems also not to be of any help in 
clarifying the applicability of mathematics, and supporters of 
this argument are in no sense exempted from the applicabil-
ity problems.
Secondly, as Pincock (2012, pp. 206-207) points out, the no-
tion of “indispensable mathematical explanation” has been 
analysed by means of two tests that require to eliminate or 
5 - See p. 2 and relative footnote.
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substitute the mathematical claims appearing in the scientif-
ic explanation. However, premise (2
EXP
) refers to mathemati-
cal entities. Hence, we need an argument that shows the link 
between these two tests and the relevance of mathematical 
entities in explanation. In absence of this link, it would be 
better to reformulate the whole argument as an argument for 
semantic, rather than metaphysical, realism. In other words, 
the argument seems to fall short of its proponents’ expectec-
tions.
Since this argument fails to argue in favour of metaphysical 
realism and seems to be better an argument for semantic re-
alism, I will not discuss here whether a clarification of the 
applicability of mathematics is in any sense required in order 
to support this explanatory indispensability argument. I will 
rather discuss this question in section 4.2, where I will take 
into consideration the semantic version of this argument.
4 – Arguments for semantic re-
alism
4.1 Putnam’s argument for semantic realism
As we already saw, Putnam argues in favour of semantic re-
alism. His conclusion is that confirmational holism commits 
us to believe that mathematical claims employed in science 
are true, as are other true scientific claims that appear in our 
best scientific theories. To do this, he relies on a notion of 
“indispensability” which differs both from Quine’s and Coly-
van’s. Whereas Quine’s notion of “indispensable
Q
” is centered 
around the practice of regimentation, Putnam’s indispensa-
bility aims rather to grasp the real meaning of the scientists’ 
claims. According to him, “one of our important purposes in 
doing physics is to try to state ‘true or nearly true’ (the phrase 
is Newton’s) laws, and not merely to build bridges or pre-
dict experiences” (Putnam 1979a, p. 338). Therefore, one of 
the main tasks of philosophy consists in acknowledging this 
purpose and respecting this character of physical inquiry. 
Thus, Putnam’s argument assumes that scientific claims have 
a more or less clear meaning that philosophical reflection 
should respect and should not demand to reformulate (as in 
Quine’s regimentation). It follows that the notion of “indis-
pensableP ” concerns the scientific claims in their original for-
mulation: something is indispensableP if it is required by the 
scientists in their formulations of a theory.
This feature of Putnam’s indispensability seems to fit better 
with an argument for metaphysical realism: if there is no 
need for regimentations or reformulations (that, depending 
on their fulfillment, could eliminate the reference to abstract 
entities), and since scientific claims on this account direct-
ly refer to mathematical entities, the argument could easily 
argue for the existence of mathematical entities rather than 
for semantic realism. However, Putnam is cautious and pre-
fers to opt for a weaker conclusion. The reason for this is that 
Putnam is worried about what he calls “equivalent construc-
tions” in mathematics, something that in his view is intrinsic 
to the mathematical formulation: “the chief characteristic of 
mathematical propositions is the very wide variety of equiv-
alent formulations that they possess” (Putnam 1979b, p. 47). 
Among these possible formulations, some of them do not 
need abstract objects (for example, modal formulations à la 
Hellman 1989), and hence it may not be necessary to include 
abstract entities in our ontology.
That said, let us go back to our main question in this section: 
how can semantic realism be of any help in solving the ap-
plicability problems? A first possible answer is that if math-
ematical propositions are true, then we can apply them just 
because they are true. The applicability of mathematical 
claims is therefore justified by their being true. However, this 
answer cannot be considered satisfying: after all, the propo-
sition “My right incisor is chipped” is true, but I can hardly 
believe that such a proposition can be of any employment in 
science. In other words, there are billions of true propositions 
that have no application in science. Why are mathematical 
propositions different?
A slightly more articulated answer is that mathematical 
claims can be successfully employed in science because they 
are true and pertain to the nature of the world. However, this 
answer too can hardly be considered satisfying, since it does 
not avoid the difficulties of the previous answer: in which 
sense, exactly, do mathematical claims ‘pertain to’ the natural 
world? In the absence of an answer to this question, semantic 
realism cannot be of any help in accounting for the effective-
ness of mathematics.
4.2 Explanatory indispensability argument for 
semantic realism 
As we saw at the end of section 3.4, it is also possible to for-
mulate an explanatory indispensability argument for seman-
tic realism:
(1
exp
) We ought to believe in the truth of any claim that plays 
an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific the-
ories;
(2
exp
) mathematical claims play an indispensable explanatory 
role in our best scientific theories;
(3
exp
) hence, we ought to believe in the truth of mathematical 
claims.
The argument is similar to the analogous argument for met-
aphysical realism, but premise (2
exp
) refers to mathematical 
claims instead of mathematical entities. In this sense, the two 
tests we previously discussed about the explanatory value of 
a claim can directly support premise (2
exp
), while for premise 
(2
EXP
) we needed another argument to show that if a mathe-
matical claim plays an indispensable explanatory role in our 
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best scientific theory then the entities entailed by that claim 
are indispensable as well.
Apparently, this argument seems to be able to remedy the dif-
ficulty of the previous argument. There I noted that seman-
tic realism cannot be of any help in explaining the effective-
ness of mathematics in science because it does not explain in 
which sense mathematical (true) claims would pertain to the 
natural world. This argument seems to suggest that mathe-
matical claims pertain to the scientific description of the nat-
ural world precisely in the sense that they are explanatorily 
relevant to this description. So, one might say, on the basis 
of this argument, that mathematics is effective in science be-
cause mathematical claims are true and they explanatorily 
pertain to scientific subjects. However, it must be noted that 
the addition of the adverb “explanatorily” does not add very 
much to the sense of “to pertain to”. This is just a way to beg 
the question: if we are interested in understanding why and 
how mathematics is so effective in science, then we are inter-
ested in understanding in which sense mathematical claims 
can be, among other things, explanatorily relevant for the sci-
entific discourse. Thus, once again, it seems that a stance on 
mathematical realism, be it semantic or metaphysical, is of 
no help in clarifying the applicability problems.
But there is something more. Let us consider the following 
examples (for more about these examples, see Maddy 1992). 
It is common, in the analysis of water-wave dispersion, to 
assume that water depth tends to infinity. Analogously, in 
fluid dynamics, scientists usually assume that matter is con-
tinuous. Both assumptions are clearly false,6 nevertheless, 
scientists make such assumptions in order to explain the 
behaviour of water waves and matter, respectively. Thus, it 
turns out that the assumptions employed here have an indis-
pensable explanatory role, but they remain false assumptions 
and nobody will hold them as true. These assumptions are 
not mathematical, strictly speaking. However it seems that 
now we have two different classes of claims: (1) true claims 
having an indispensable explanatory role in our best scien-
tific theories, and (2) false claims (idealizations, for the most 
part) that notwithstanding play an indispensable explanato-
ry role in our best scientific theories. The problem is: how 
can we say that mathematical claims fall within the first of 
the two classes? It seems that we need a specific argument to 
show that, but how can such an argument be? To prove that a 
mathematical claim p falls into class (1) we should prove that 
it is true, but if we have an argument to prove that p is true 
we don’t need any indispensability argument to prove what 
we have already proved in a different way! 
However, this does more than point out the risk of a vicious 
circularity in the argument; it also shows a conflict between 
naturalism and confirmational holism: scientists do not hes-
itate to assume patently false claims in order to get the job 
done, but confirmational holism does not permit us to ac-
count for this peculiarity of scientific practice, thus pushing 
us away from naturalism.7
5 – Conclusion
Indispensability arguments are our best and most compelling 
arguments for mathematical realism. However, we have seen 
that these arguments do not clear their supporters from the 
applicability problems raised by Wigner (1960) and Steiner 
(1998). This holds not only for supporters of Quine’s indis-
pensability argument—as Colyvan (2001b) already pointed 
out—but, as I have shown, also for supporters of other ver-
sions of indispensability arguments, like Putnam’s version 
or the explanatory indispensability arguments. As I have al-
ready noted, these arguments do not directly deal with the 
mathematical applicability problems, and in this sense it is 
not a surprise that they do not solve them. What really is a 
surprise is the fact that, besides these arguments explicit-
ly based on the applicability of mathematics, supporters of 
these arguments ignored for very long time the philosophical 
problems arising from the applicability of mathematics.
However, in the present paper I showed that the problem 
at issue is even more compelling, since, apparently, if the 
supporters of the indispensability arguments do not take 
into account that mathematics has many different applica-
tions in science, they incur difficulties that may undermine 
their arguments. The applicability of mathematics cannot be 
simply assumed as a brute fact, and be left unanalyzed. In-
deed, a better comprehension of mathematical applicability 
seems to be necessary in order to avoid serious difficulties. 
In other words, the indispensability of mathematics cannot 
be uncritically assumed to justify ontological realism, but it is 
important (and— let me say—indispensable) to deal with the 
concrete problems posed by the application of mathematics.
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6 - The first assumption concerning depth of water is patently false; the second one is false if we assume that our best scientific theories about the ultimate 
composition of matter are true.
7 - It is not clear to which extent confirmational holism is needed to support premise (1
exp
) and this point is currently a matter of discussion (see for example 
Panza & Sereni 2015). If we can do without it, then these last criticisms do not really undermine the indispensability argument.
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